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Financial responsibility provisions require firms whose activities involve
risks of damages exceeding their net worth to maintain minimum levels of
insurance. Incentives created by policy conditions and premium schedules
arising under mandatory insurance schemes can significantly strengthen
the deterrent effects of liability rules and provide a valuable supplement to
regulatory safety standards. These incentives can only arise, however, if
two conditions are met. First, insurers must be able to monitor insureds'
safety practices at reasonable cost. Second, applicable liability standards
must allow insurers to predict liability on the basis of safety practices.
These requirements create a tension between deterrent aims, which
favor easy enforcement of insureds' obligations and a tight link between
actions and liability, and compensatory aims, which are often served by
restrictions on insurers' ability to limit coverage and by attenuated links
between actions and liability. The appropriate balance between deterrent
and compensatory aims in any given context depends largely on the bene-
fits that can be obtained by supplementing direct safety regulation with
insurance-based incentives.
This Note examines the preconditions and potential benefits of deter-
ring accidents through financial responsibility. The Note then applies
these general insights to financial responsibility requirements and liability
standards pertaining to hazardous waste management, arguing that the
potential benefits of insurance-based incentives in this area justify revision
of existing financial responsibility and liability standards.
I. THE DETERRENT POTENTIAL OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS
In recent years, financial responsibility requirements have become in-
creasingly common in federal health and safety statutes.' State financial
1. Provisions mandating or expressly authorizing financial responsibility requirements are partic-
ularly prevalent in federal statutes that seek to control environmental harms. See, e.g., Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1257(0 (1982) (requiring permit applicants to
obtain liability insurance adequate to provide for personal injury and property damage); Federal
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responsibility requirements include compulsory workers' compensation
and automobile liability insurance, as well as a growing number of envi-
ronmental coverage requirements.2 Existing financial responsibility re-
quirements and liability requirements are better suited to providing pri-
vate sources of compensation than to deterring unsafe practices through
insurance-based incentives. Even legislative histories that mention the po-
tential deterrent effects of financial responsibility' often ignore the tension
between compensating victims-an objective that favors restrictions on in-
surance contracts and expansive liability standards-and deterring acci-
dents-an objective that requires easier enforcement of insureds' obliga-
tions and a tighter link between actions and liability. Consequently, the
potential benefits of using financial responsibility to augment direct regu-
lation have not been realized.
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. 111984) (imposing statutory financial
responsibility requirements for ships carrying oil or hazardous substances); Deepwater Port Act of
1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(l) (1982) (authorizing regulatory financial responsibility requirements for
ships and deepwater port operators); Atomic Energy Damages (Price-Anderson) Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2210(a)-(b) (1982) (requiring compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission financial responsibil-
ity provisions as prerequisite for obtaining permits to operate nuclear reactors); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(a)(6), 6924(t)(1), 6925(e)(3)(B), 6991b(d) (1982
& Supp. 11 1984) (requiring Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish financial responsi-
bility requirements for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal sites, and for underground
storage tanks); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9608(a)-(b) (1982) (establishing financial responsibility requirements for ships carrying hazardous
substances and authorizing regulatory standards for other facilities that handle these substances);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1815(a)-(c) (1982) (requiring
ships using offshore port facilities to maintain financial responsibility sufficient to meet statutory lia-
bility levels).
Financial responsibility may also be required by regulations promulgated under broad mandates to
control specified harms. Invoking its broad authority to protect marine ecosystems through restrictions
on ocean dumping permits, Marine Resource Protection and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a)
(1982), EPA has proposed insurance requirements for ocean-going hazardous waste incinerators. Cov-
erage levels have not yet been specified, but EPA has proposed that a minimum level between $50
million and $500 million be selected. See Ocean Incineration Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 8222,
8233-35 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 234.10) (proposed Feb. 28, 1985).
2. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10-281 (Supp. 1986) (mandating state regulations to ensure finan-
cial responsibility of parties abandoning hazardous waste sites); 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,728-33,
28,753-55 (1985) (discussing state financial responsibility requirements for firms in hazardous waste
industry); M. WOODRUFF, J. FONSECA & A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No
FAULT LAW § 3.5 (1974 & Supp. 1983) (summarizing state automobile insurance requirements and
related case law); Workmen's Comp. L. Rep. (CCH) % 6004-6054 (indexing and summarizing state
workers' compensation laws).
3. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-43 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2283, 2324-25 (financial responsibility will improve truckers' safety
practices because "premiums [that insurers] assess are in direct relation to the risks they assume"); S.
REP. No. 1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 7529, 7543 (financial responsibility intended to "induce maximum effort to prevent the dis-
charge of hazardous substances . . . without . . . impairling] competition for deepwater port li-
censes"); see also Request for Comments on RCRA Financial Responsibility Options, 50 Fed. Reg.
33,902, 33,907 (1985) ("[Sluch insurance would provide an effective market force mechanism to help
regulate and reduce the risk of environmental damage by an insured facility or organization by de-
manding responsible environmental management as a condition and cost off] insurance.").
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A. The Theory of Controlling Accident Costs Through Financial
Responsibility
Financial responsibility provisions improve safety by preventing insol-
vency from undermining the deterrent effects of liability rules." Liability
rules, standing alone, induce profit-maximizing firms to invest in accident
avoidance only insofar as accident avoidance reduces risks to the firms'
own assets.5 Thus, an undercapitalized firm engaged in a risky activity
can be expected to cut corners on safety expenditures with the expectation
that any damages exceeding the firm's net worth will be borne by third
parties. The increased private returns obtained by externalizing liability
costs will, all else equal, confer a competitive advantage on undercapital-
ized enterprises.'
Eliminating insolvency as a means of externalizing accident costs can
decrease accident levels both by increasing the private costs of goods and
services produced through processes that create significant accident risks
(thereby reducing overall levels of risky activity), and by strengthening
incentives to invest in specific loss-avoidance measures., The first source
4. Two recent contributions to the law and economics literature investigate other methods for
preserving the deterrent effect of liability rules in the face of insolvency problems. See Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (1984)
(delineating circumstances under which personal liability for managers can correct for corporations'
tendency to undercapitalize in relation to potential liability); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Lia-
bility, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1244, 1246-47 (1984) (arguing that vicarious liability may correct for the
undercapitalization of employees acting as agents of employer). Both managerial liability and vicari-
ous liability correct for the adverse incentive effects of undercapitalization only if managers or vicari-
ously liable principals hold sufficient assets and assess risks competently. Financial responsibility re-
quirements avoid these potential failings by specifying minimum asset levels and by requiring risk
assessments by insurers, whose survival in competitive markets for risk bearing depends upon accurate
assessments of risk.
The imposition of liability on stockholders of undercapitalized corporations, a policy of "piercing
the corporate veil" in instances of undercapitalization, could also promote accident deterrence. Present
standards for piercing the corporate veil, however, generally do not penalize undercapitalization. See
Kraakman, supra, at 869 n.32 ("[O]nly the California courts. . . have gone so far as to suggest that
undercapitalization relative to risk may itself be a ground for disregarding the corporate fiction and
holding shareholders liable for tort debts."); see also Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Haz-
ardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REv. 986 (1986) (arguing that federal courts
should pierce corporate veil of parent corporations when subsidiary corporations held liable under
CEROLA lack assets to cover damages). Moreover, shareholder liability, like liability for managers or
principals, corrects for undercapitalization only if the parties onto whom liability is shifted hold suffi-
cient assets and assess risks competently.
5. A firm that would be forced into bankruptcy by a $100,000 liability judgment has no economic
incentive to expend resources to reduce the expected liability associated with a potential accident from
S500,000 to $125,000. Moreover, a $25,000 investment in nonredeployable accident prevention mea-
sures would reduce available assets to $75,000, further distorting loss avoidance incentives. See Landes
& Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STuD.
417, 419-22 (1984) (presenting simplified model of profit-maximizing investments in prevention of
low-probability, high-cost accidents).
6. See Kraakman, supra note 4, at 869-70; Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Con-
trol of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 71 & n.269 (1980) (noting incentive for large firms to
limit liability by contracting out risky projects to undercapitalized spin-offs).
7. See G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTs 73-74 (1971) (identifying these mechanisms of
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of accident reduction requires only that prices, on average, reflect accident
costs." For example, a mandatory automobile insurance plan that charged
all drivers a uniform rate would reduce the number of accidents caused by
judgment-proof drivers simply by raising the cost of driving, despite the
absence of incentives on drivers to avoid being classified as high risk
insureds.
Incentives for specific improvements in operating practices, on the other
hand, depend critically on the efforts of insurers-or other financial guar-
antors-to "regulate" risky activities. Incentives to invest in safety mea-
sures can reduce accident costs to a greater extent and at far lower social
cost than can general reductions in activity levels. The mechanisms
through which insurance requirements encourage safety improvements in-
clude risk assessments that precede the issuance or renewal of policies,
premium schedules that categorize insureds based on differences in ex-
pected losses, and contract provisions that require adherence to specified
safety practices.10
Analyses of insurance and accident deterrence often assert that insur-
ance weakens safety incentives by transferring risk from insureds to insur-
ers." Unqualified assertions that insurance weakens deterrence,," how-
ever, ignore evidence that insurers can contribute significantly to effective
accident cost reduction as alternate forms of "general deterrence").
8. The deterrence of accidents through generalized increases in the private costs of risky activities
is analyzed at length in Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
Shavell argues that the benefits of reducing aggregate levels of injuring activities will, in many cir-
cumstances, justify imposition of a strict liability rather than a negligence standard. Id. at 10-16.
9. While insurance is the most common form of financial responsibility coverage, some financial
responsibility standards also permit other forms of asset guarantees. Federal coverage standards for
firms that treat, store, and dispose of hazardous wastes, for example, permit firms to demonstrate
financial responsibility by obtaining insurance, a corporate guarantee, a surety bond, or a letter of
credit, or by qualifying as a "self-insurer." 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t)(1) (Supp. I 1984). Any of these
forms of coverage implicitly or explicitly prices accident risks. However, insurance and surety ap-
proaches, which assign prices to risks in competitive markets, may produce more accurate assessments
than financial tests, which depend ultimately on shareholders' concerns about risks to corporate assets
as a check on management safety decisions. Insurance companies' shareholders and managers are far
more likely to pay careful attention to risk portfolios than are shareholders and managers of most
manufacturing enterprises.
10. See C. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 42-44 (1985); see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 60-62 (describing
risk differentiation by insurers).
11. See C. HEIMER, supra note 10, at 35-36.
12. See, e.g., Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation,
33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1298 (1980) (tort damages "reexternalized through liability insurance...
[because] insurance costs reflect only crudely, if at all, variations in risks of accidents among firms and
activities"). But see Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 861 n.51 (1984) (arguing that experience rating by
insurers provides safety incentives).
The perception that insurance attenuates the deterrent effect of liability rules was, from 1971
through 1982, reflected in provisions of New York insurance law that prohibited coverage for dam-
ages caused by gradual pollution. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 46(13)-(14) (McKinnney 1966 & Supp. 1982),
repealed by 1982 N.Y. Laws 2060.
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risk management. For example, insurers sponsored research and inspec-
tion programs that dramatically improved elevator and steam boiler safety
in the 1930's and 1940's.11 Insurers' advantages over individual insureds
in collecting and analyzing risk data, and in researching and developing
safety standards, often outweighed any attenuation of safety incentives
that resulted from the pooling of risks.14 More recent illustrations of the
beneficial effects of insurers' expertise in risk management include the ex-
tensive risk assessment procedures underwriters employ to screen appli-
cants for pollution liability coverage.1 5
Insurers' marked advantages in analyzing and managing risks have im-
proved decisions about accident avoidance even in circumstances in which
insurance insulates insureds' own assets from liability judgments. The po-
tential for improving deterrence is still stronger in the case of coverage
that insureds obtain to satisfy financial responsibility requirements
designed to prevent undercapitalization.
B. Financial Responsibility and Direct Regulation
The advisability of efforts to deter accidents through appropriately
structured financial responsibility requirements depends, in any given con-
text, on the benefits of augmenting regulatory controls with market incen-
tives. A general approach to this assessment must confront two distinct
issues: (1) What conditions must exist for effective insurance-based incen-
tives to arise? and (2) Under what circumstances will insurance-based in-
centives, once established, promote deterrence effectively?
13. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J.
549, 560-61 & n.33 (1948). Professor James also found that insurers prompted marked safety im-
provements in industrial machinery and aircraft. Id. at 561; see also C. HEIMER, supra note 10, at
61-66 (describing reductions in fire losses achieved by Factory Mutual insurance groups).
14. James, supra note 13, at 563 (insurance credited with effecting "net gain in accident
prevention").
Respiratory disease among asbestos workers illustrates the social costs of insulating decisions about
risk from the kind of systematic information and expertise possessed by insurers. A recent account of
cases brought by asbestos installers against asbestos manufacturers indicates that by 1918-more than
fifty years before the first successful suit by an asbestos worker against a manufacturer-American
and Canadian life insurance companies had already begun to deny coverage to asbestos workers. P.
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIscoNoucr 13-14 (1985). By 1928, other life insurers had identified
asbestos workers as particularly high mortality risks and adjusted premium schedules accordingly. Id.
at 200. Tragically, however, neither workers' compensation premiums, which reflected state law ex-
clusions for long-latent and partially disabling diseases, nor manufacturers' general liability premi-
ums, which reflected the severe limits that traditional rules of causation and privity imposed on work-
ers' prospects of establishing manufacturer liability, brought this information to bear on pricing and
safety practices within the industry.
15. See, e.g., Smith, Environmental Damage Liability Insurance-A Primer, 39 Bus. LAw. 333,
341 (1983) (describing risk assessments required of applicants for environmental damage liability
insurance); Pollution Underwriters Must Be Cautious Lot, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. CASUALTY
EDITION, December 28, 1984, at 44 (John Metelski, Vice President of Stewart Smith Mid-America,
stated that "although the hard reality is profit, the eventual result of a coverage such as [environmen-
tal impairment liability] will be a cleaner environment").
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1. The Prerequisites of Effective Insurance-Based Incentives
Insurance contracts establish principal-agent relationships 6 between in-
surers and policy holders. The principal (the insurer) shares in the risk of
undesirable outcomes that only the agent (the policy holder) can influence
directly. Parties to insurance contracts, like parties to other principal-
agent relationships, seek to reduce "moral hazard" (i.e., to maintain in-
centives for agents to strive for beneficial outcomes)1 7 without sacrificing
the advantages of shifting some risks to the principals.
According to economic analyses of the principal-agent relationship, the
effectiveness of incentives for appropriate behavior by agents depends on
the costs of monitoring behavior and on the correlation between agents'
behavior and outcomes.18 Thus, sophisticated insurance-based incentives
will arise only where insurers easily can monitor loss prevention and
where loss prevention measures strongly influence expected liability.
Monitoring costs comprise both the costs of observing insureds' behav-
ior and the costs of devising and administering policy conditions that pro-
mote efficient loss prevention.19 Monitoring effectiveness can be reduced,
therefore, by restrictions on insurance contracts that preclude certain mon-
itoring and enforcement options.2 0 Restrictions on insurers' use of incen-
tive mechanisms, such as deductibles, coinsurance requirements, and cov-
erage ceilings, may advance compensatory alms by ensuring that financial
guarantors will be responsible to victims for full costs. At the same time,
16. Here, the phrase "principal-agent relationship" refers to the broad range of economic ar-
rangements in which the actions of one party, subject to more or less effective controls by the other,
affect outcomes important to both. This functional definition, commonly employed in the economics
literature, encompasses a broader range of arrangements than does the legal concept of agency, which
applies to legal rights and responsibilities created by agreements through which principals delegate
legal authority to agents to act on their behalf. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
17. "Moral hazard" refers broadly to aspects of insureds' behavior that increase losses. C.
HEIMER, supra note 10, at 29-30. Moral hazard has two components: unobserved risk factors that
predate insurance coverage (e.g., a propensity to commit fraud), and reductions in care that occur as
economically rational responses to risk spreading. Id. Insurers often frame the moral hazard problem
primarily in terms of the need to screen for preexisting risk factors. In practice, however, insurers also
devote considerable attention to the control of ex post incentive effects through mechanisms such as
discriminating premium schedules and coverage restrictions designed to encourage loss avoidance. Id.
at 37-48.
18. See Sykes, supra note 4, at 1236-38 (distinguishing among unobservable, imperfectly observa-
ble, and cheaply observable behavior and discussing significance of these differences to principal-agent
relationship); see also Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship,
10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979) (presenting formal model of effects of monitoring costs on principal-
agent agreements).
19. The technical features of insured enterprises-such as the extent to which risks depend on
variation in operating procedures, which tends to be difficult to monitor, as opposed to facility design,
which is typically easier to observe-will influence the effectiveness of insurance-based incentives.
20. The financial responsibility provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act, for example, substantially limit the types of loss prevention incentives
that insurers can write into contracts covering liability for hazardous waste releases. 42 U.S.C. §
9608(c) (1982); see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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however, such restrictions can diminish the deterrent effects of financial
responsibility by increasing the administrative costs of incentive mecha-
nisms that insurers use to encourage loss prevention."
The effectiveness of insurance-based safety incentives will also depend
on the sophistication of the risk classifications that insurers use to catego-
rize insureds. If risks are precisely categorized, firms seeking insurance
will encounter appropriate incentives to invest in efficient loss prevention
measures. Precise risk categorization requires a predictable relationship
between safety practices and liability. This connection is attenuated by
liability rules that hold solvent, accessible parties liable for harms caused
by insolvent or inaccessible ones. If differences in loss-prevention measures
have little bearing on expected liability, insurers will find it unprofitable
to discriminate among insureds on the basis of safety practices.22
Decisions about the expansiveness of liability standards, like choices
about limits on insurers' abilities to enforce policy conditions, therefore,
involve tradeoffs between the compensatory and deterrent aims of finan-
cial responsibility provisions. Expansion of the scope of liability increases
the likelihood of attaching liability to some solvent party but decreases the
chances that insurers will discern an actuarially significant relationship
between safety practices and expected claims.
2. Assessing the Role of Insurance-Based Incentives
Assessments of the benefits of supplementing direct regulation with
market deterrence require comparisons of the effectiveness of liability
rules and regulation, and of the competence of regulators and insurers in
various settings. 3 The appropriate mix of the two approaches2 depends
21. Cheek, Risk-Spreaders or Risk-Eliminators? An Insurer's Perspective on the Liability and
Financial Responsibility Provisions of RCRA and CERCLA, 2 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 149,
171-73 (1982) (decrying restrictions on risk allocation in insurance contracts).
Some restrictions on insurers' defenses are needed to prevent insureds from circumventing financial
responsibility requirements by obtaining inexpensive, strictly conditioned policies without any expec-
tation of complying with policy conditions. Otherwise, when liability arose, the.insurer would assert
its policy defenses, leaving injured parties to assert their claims against judgment-proof insureds. To
advance both deterrent and compensatory goals, therefore, financial responsibility requirements should
permit insurers to enforce deductible provisions and coverage limitations only insofar as these mecha-
nisms place insureds' own assets at risk.
22. In many circumstances strict liability will produce a more regular relationship between ac-
tions and consequences than will a negligence standard because of the uncertainties associated with
the judicial determinations of due care that a negligence standard requires. See Calabresi & Hirschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1075-76 (1972) (describing sources
of uncertainty in judicial administration of negligence standard).
23. The availability of alternative forms of compensation for victims will also be relevant. The
distributional consequences of tightening liability rules to establish a predictable link between actions
and consequences will be far more acceptable if alternative sources of compensation such as first-party
insurance coverage, social insurance, or administrative compensation funds exist (or can be put into
place) than if damages from liable parties represent victims' sole recourse.
24. Exclusive reliance on regulation may be warranted where excessive monitoring costs and diffi-
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upon the nature of the harm to be controlled, the latency period between
risky behavior and resultant harm, and the level of detail and rate of
change required in control standards. 5
Many harms cannot be compensated by liability actions because vic-
tims' losses are smaller than the costs of establishing legal liability or be-
cause weak causal connections between injurers and harms frustrate ef-
forts to identify injurers.28 In such cases, liability rules will not internalize
the full social costs of risky practices. Regulation will, therefore, be re-
quired to control accident costs.
Inaccurate assessments of long-term risks can also lead to inefficient
levels of investment in safety incentives.27 Insurance-based incentives offer
a distinct advantage over regulation in overcoming this obstacle. To oper-
ate profitably, insurers must maintain strong incentives for underwriters
to assess risks accurately. 8 Regulatory standards are less likely to reflect
culties in establishing liability preclude the development of useful risk categories, or where there is
widespread agreement about acceptable practices affecting uniform, well understood risks. See
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 22, at 1076 ("Where a collective determination that an action is
not worthwhile can be made with a modicum of assurance, prohibitions enforced criminally or
through uninsurable fines seem appropriate."). Conversely, exclusive reliance on insurance-based in-
centives to control risks appears most attractive where monitoring and causation problems are tracta-
ble and where regulatory controls fail to keep pace with rapidly changing or widely varying risks.
Even where the efficiency attributes of market incentives are most attractive, however, some measure
of "inefficient" regulation may be desirable as a means of allowing public participation in important
decisions about social risks. See generally Comment, Due Process Rights of Participation in Adminis-
trative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886, 887-98 (1975) (discussing practical and symbolic bene-
fits of public participation in agency rulemaking).
25. Professor Shavell has investigated a different aspect of the choice between regulation and lia-
bility rules. Shavell develops a mathematical model demonstrating the advantages of combining regu-
lation and liability incentives where (1) regulators lack complete information concerning risks, and (2)
liability rules are weakened by asset insufficiency and the possibility that injured parties will fail to
bring suit. Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 271 (1984). This Note suggests that financial responsibility requirements can, by correcting
the asset insufficiency problem, enhance the effectiveness of liability incentives without incurring the
severe informational problems associated with direct regulation.
26. Analyses of tort suits brought by asbestos workers, soldiers exposed to Agent Orange, and
daughters of women who took DES during pregnancy have questioned the usefulness of existing tort
remedies in mass exposure cases because of the administrative costs associated with litigation involving
such widespread injuries and complex issues of causation. See, e.g., Epstein, The Legal and Insur-
ance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 491-95 (1984); Landes & Posner,
supra note 5 (suggesting that effects of causal uncertainty could be ameliorated by allowing suits for
probabilistic damages before injuries become manifest); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 881-87 (propos-
ing tort awards based on proportionate liability and probabilistic assessments of harm in toxic tort
cases).
For an illustration of the difficulties that plaintiffs often face in establishing a link between environ-
mental contamination and adverse health effects, see Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,
506-20 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. Both underestimates and overestimates of future risks impose social costs. Underestimates per-
mit accidents to occur that could have been efficiently avoided; overestimates cause resources to be
expended on safety that could be employed more productively elsewhere.
28. Some observers have faulted the insurance industry for responding to high interest rates dur-
ing the mid-1970's and early 1980's by reducing premiums to increase their supply of investment
funds. See, e.g., Solomon, Finger-Pointing Distinguishes Attempts To Fix Blame for Liability Crisis,
18 NAT'L J. 378, 379 (1986) (citing industry critics' views of insurer responsibility for business cycle
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accurate assessments of long-latent risks because incentives on regulators
often favor the interests of powerful political constituencies, rather than
the broad public interest in minimizing the sum of losses and avoidance
costs. Time horizons for regulatory policy makers, moreover, often do not
extend beyond the next election. Although political alignments may some-
times permit officials to "do well while doing good," regulators do not
operate under the steady pressures for accurate risk assessments that mar-
kets impose on insurers.2"
Delays and resource demands associated with rulemaking procedures
constrain the specificity and adaptability of regulatory standards.30 Oppo-
nents of stricter controls may block or delay regulatory change when stan-
dards are under consideration within the agency, when agency proposals
are evaluated by the Office of Management and Budget," or when Con-
gress appropriates enforcement funds. After a regulatory initiative clears
these hurdles, the promulgating agency may still have to devote extensive
resources to litigation concerning its adherence to rulemaking procedures
and fidelity to the authorizing statute.
in insurance industry); Wayne, Insurance Industry Under Fire, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1986, at Dl,
col. 3 (discussing effects of investment income on underwriting practices). The influence of investment
returns on the premiums that insurers charge to indemnify against accident risks does not, however,
argue persuasively against insurance-based incentives. Future costs must be discounted whenever
choices are made concerning present and future streams of costs and benefits, regardless of whether
insurers or regulators perform the calculations. For a description of the methodology of discounting
future income streams, including some of the factors that influence the choice of social discount rates,
see E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 112-17, 136-40 (1972).
Insurers derive their discount rates from projections about investment performance-projections
that respond, in a rough way, to changes in the growth rate of the economy. There is no obvious
reason why discount rates set by insurers in this manner should be considered inferior to rates set by
the clash of competing interests in the rulemaking process.
29. Well organized opponents of controls may "capture" the agencies that regulate them and exert
direct pressure on the content of regulations. See, e.g., NoIl, The Economics and Politics of Regula-
tion, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016, 1028-32 (1971). Interest group pressures may also operate more subtly,
by influencing the information that the agency chooses to collect and the problems it chooses to inves-
tigate. For a review of various capture theories and an investigation of their applicability to four
agencies, see P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981).
30. Normal agency rulemaking follows the notice and comment procedures specified in section
553 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Rulemaking under statutes that call
for rulemaking on the record is governed by the more detailed procedures of §§ 556 and 557. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-557 (1982).
Rulemaking also raises enormous logistical problems associated with organizing the information
required to set generally applicable standards. See, e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
109-112 (1982) (discussing informational problems encountered by automobile safety regulators).
31. OMB reviews proposed regulatory actions under authority of Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1981), which establishes a system of pre-publication review, and Exec. Order No.
12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. III 1985), which gives OMB
authority over agency rulemaking agendas at an earlier stage. OMB review has often caused signifi-
cant delay in the issuance of regulatory health and safety standards. See, e.g., Environmental Defense
Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570-71 (D.D.C. 1986) (enjoining OMB from introducing any
further delay that could cause EPA to miss statutory deadlines); see also Morrison, OMB Interference
with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064-71
(1986) (criticizing delay and weakening of health and safety standards due to OMB review).
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The administrative costs to insurers of amending policy conditions or
changing premium rates are far lower. In a competitive insurance market,
insureds bargain for the best obtainable cost combination of policy condi-
tions, coverage, and premiums. Insurers who assess risks competently will
offer attractive packages without incurring undue risks. Less competent
risk assessments will lead to lost business or excessive liability. Thus in-
surance markets not only permit, but require, constant adjustments to
changed information.
II. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTES
The hazardous waste problem aptly illustrates the enormous social costs
of permitting risky activities to be conducted under ineffective regulatory
controls and liability incentives.32 The current combination of regulatory
standards and liability rules continues to permit handling and disposal
practices that impose substantial long-term external costs.33
This section draws on the general insights developed in Part I to argue
that the current policy of relying almost entirely on direct regulation to
deter unsafe practices is misguided. Insurance-based incen-
tives-particularly incentives affecting generators of hazardous
waste-could significantly improve the control of environmental risks,
provided that appropriate reforms were undertaken to establish the pre-
requisites for effective risk differentiation by insurers.
A. Existing Controls on Hazardous Wastes
Two statutes carry the burden of the federal response to releases of
hazardous wastes into the environment: the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)34 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).35 RCRA
32. The Office of Technology Assessment recently estimated that 10,000 or more hazardous waste
sites are likely to require government cleanup and that these cleanups will require "easily $100 billion
or more" in funds from the federal Superfund program. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SUPERFUND STRATEGY 3, 11-15 (1985).
EPA's published list of priority cleanup projects currently contains 538 sites, the majority of which
are abandoned disposal sites. See National Priorities List, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1985). Projec-
tions based on cleanup financing patterns to date suggest that parties who owned, operated or contrib-
uted to these sites ultimately will provide between 29% and 44% of cleanup costs. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA's PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF FUTURE HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
COSTS ARE UNCERTAIN 8, app. 111 (1984).
33. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). Additional, more limited controls on hazardous sub-
stances are imposed by the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp.
1984) (testing and regulation of chemical products presenting unreasonable risk); the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(C)-(D), 1317(a) (1982) (releases of hazardous water
pollutants into navigable waters); and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982) (emission of haz-
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requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to impose record-
keeping, containment, and labelling regulations on waste generators and
transporters."6 These requirements include a manifest system for tracking
hazardous wastes from generator to final disposal site. 7 In addition,
RCRA mandates more extensive regulation of treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities (TSDF's), including the imposition of financial responsibil-
ity standards.38
CERCLA is designed primarily to remedy environmental damages
caused by past improper disposal practices. CERCLA authorizes the
President to respond to releases and threatened releases of hazardous sub-
stances by ordering or negotiating private cleanups, or by initiating gov-
ernment sponsored cleanups using the "Superfund," a trust fund fi-
nanced initially through general appropriations and special taxes on
petroleum and basic industrial chemicals,4 and replenished by recoveries
from responsible parties under CERCLA's expansive liability standard.4'
To prevent insolvency on the part of responsible parties from undermin-
ing CERCLA liability, the Act imposes financial responsibility require-
ardous air pollutants).
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6923 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1-.33, 262.10-.51,
263.10-.31 (1985); Revised Small-Scale Generator Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,146, 10,175-76 (1986)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20, 263.20).
37. The manifest system is required by §§ 3002(5) and 3004(a)(2) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§
6922(5), 6924(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Regulations implementing the manifest provisions re-
quire generators to prepare detailed shipping documents for all hazardous wastes transported off site;
the documents must specify the quantities and characteristics of the wastes and the source, route, and
ultimate destination of each shipment. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20-.23 (1985); Revised Small-Scale Genera-
tor Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,146, 10,175 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20(e)). For a
more detailed description of the manifest system, see DiBenedetto, Generator Liability Under the
Common Law and Federal and State Statutes, 39 Bus. LAW. 611, 625-28 (1984).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). RCRA provides for enforcement of these
detailed TSDF standards through a permitting system administered by EPA and by states that meet
the statutory standards for operating their own hazardous waste programs. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982 &
Supp. 111984). A TSDF may not be operated without a permit. Facilities that were in operation on
November 19, 1980, however, may obtain "interim permits," which are governed by more lenient
standards than final permits, pending review of their final permit applications. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (e)
(Supp. 11 1984).
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a) (1982).
40. See CERCLA §§ 211(a), 222-223, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 42 U.S.C. §
9632-9633 (1982) (establishing taxes and response trust fund). The Superfund (known formally as
the Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund) should be distinguished from the Post-Closure Lia-
bility Trust Fund, also established by CERCLA, which is financed through fees assessed for the
disposal of hazardous wastes. CERCLA §§ 231-232, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682, 42 U.S.C. § 9641
(1982). The Post-Closure Fund assumes all liabilities to third parties for TSDF's that have been
closed and maintained for five years in accordance with RCRA standards and that can "demonstrate
that there is no substantial likelihood" of releases of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k)(1)
(1982).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982); infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing liability
standard).
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ments on cargo ships42 and authorizes regulatory financial responsibility
standards for generators and transporters.43
Current federal law thus contains the foundations for two distinct
mechanisms for encouraging safer hazardous waste management: (1) di-
rect regulatory control under the RCRA reporting and permitting pro-
grams, and (2) liability for cleanup costs and natural resource damages.
The financial responsibility requirements of RCRA and CERCLA re-
present a potentially important mechanism for deterring unsafe practices.
Existing law and policies squander this potential.
1. Direct Regulation of Hazardous Waste Facilities
In the decade since the enactment of RCRA, direct regulation has failed
to achieve, or even to approach, adequate control of hazardous waste man-
agement. Congressional hearings and General Accounting Office investi-
gations have repeatedly described critical shortcomings in the RCRA
regulatory program, including long delays in imposing standards, 44
the failure of standards, when finally formulated, to promote full in-
ternalization of environmental costs, 4 5  and inadequate
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a) (1982). Specifically, CERCLA requires owners and operators of "ves-
sels" (excluding nonmotorized barges that do not carry hazardous substances) to carry coverage of at
least $300 per gross ton. For vessels that carry hazardous substances as cargo, a minimum level of at
least $5 million is required.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b) (1982). This section directs the President to promulgate financial respon-
sibility requirements "for facilities in addition to those under subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act . . . and other Federal law." It is unclear whether Congress intended for this language to allow
CERCLA regulations to supersede other financial responsibility requirements or to limit CERCLA
financial responsibility to firms not otherwise covered.
44. One recent congressional report stated: "The Committee is extremely concerned that EPA has
not been able to comply with past statutory mandates and timetables, not just for RCRA, but for
virtually all its programs." H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5593; see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch,
12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376, 20,376-77 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982) (EPA delay in issuing
regulations governing cleanup actions), modified, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,401 (D.D.C.
Mar. 19, 1982); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986)
(unrealized aims of "unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol Hill can still be pursued administra-
tively by delaying enactment of regulations beyond the date of a statutory deadline").
Delay has also plagued EPA's application of these performance standards through the permitting
process. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERIM REPORT ON INSPECTION, ENFORCEMENT,
AND PERMITTING ACTIVITIES OF HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES 18-19 (1983) [hereinafter IN-
TERIM REPORT] (permitting process complete for only 24 of 8000 existing facilities; officials expect to
finish processing initial permit applications between 1990 and 1993).
45. Technical assessments uniformly acknowledge the impermanence of existing containment
methods. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 139 ("even with compli-
ance with RCRA groundwater protection standards, land disposal will still pose serious risks to health
and environment" (emphasis omitted)); EPA's Regulations for Land Disposal of Hazardous Wastes:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Science and Technol-
ogy, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 100-95 (1982) (technical experts detailing inadequacies of RCRA contain-
ment and monitoring standards). Even the EPA, in an unusually candid preamble to a proposed rule,
has stated that "in most cases, even with the application of best available land disposal technology,
[migration of wastes] will occur eventually." Proposed TSDF Standards, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,128
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enforcement." In 1984, Congress responded to these problems by tighten-
ing RCRA standards pertaining to land disposal,4 imposing deadlines for
the enforcement of new restrictions,4 and constraining EPA's discretion
over enforcement policy.49 The 1984 amendments may effect some limited
improvements, but the institutional limitations discussed above sharply
limit the improvements that can be expected from revisions to EPA's stat-
utory mandate.50
(1981) (regulations codified in revised form at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 260 & 264) (proposed Feb. 5,
1981).
Impermanent disposal options would not externalize costs if disposal charges reflected the full costs
of future corrective measures. Existing RCRA provisions for closure and site maintenance, however,
fail to bring these costs to bear on present waste management decisions.
46. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 44, at 14-16 (only 45% of facilities reviewed in four-
state survey inspected in preceding two years, despite EPA policy requiring biennial inspections); see
also Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 409-12 (1983) [hereinafter Control and Enforcement Hearings] (statement of
Anthony Z. Roisman, former Chief of Hazardous Waste Section in Lands and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice) (criticizing "virtually non-existent" enforcement of RCRA
requirements due to extensive cuts in enforcement budget).
One aspect of the enforcement problem concerns the difficulty of communicating the relevant stan-
dards to regulated parties. A 1983 survey found that fewer than one half of small business managers
were familiar with federal or state regulations on hazardous waste disposal. See Wall St. J., July 25,
1983, at 13, col. 1. Once mandatory coverage requirements were publicized and enforced-a far sim-
pler task, it would seem, than communicating specific design standards-prices and policy conditions
administered by insurers would provide a reliable means of transmitting information concerning steps
required to reduce environmental risks.
47. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (Supp. 111984)). The 1984 Amendments flatly
prohibit certain land disposal practices and require EPA to reassess others under tight deadlines and
new, more stringent statutory standards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(c)(1)-(2), 6924(g) (Supp. II
1984) (prohibiting landfill disposal of hazardous wastes in free liquid form effective Apr. 8, 1985,
mandating regulations to minimize landfill disposal of containerized hazardous wastes by Feb. 8,
1986, and requiring formal EPA assessment of appropriateness of landfill disposal for each type of
hazardous waste).
For a discussion of Congress' reasons for establishing specific statutory standards, despite its ac-
knowledged weaknesses as a standard setter, see Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazard-
ous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALE J. REG. 351 (1986). Congressman Florio declines to attribute
the poor performance of EPA's hazardous waste programs to structural problems such as chronic
inefficiency or agency capture. He nevertheless identifies another "structural problem" when he states
that "[tihe present conflict between Congress and EPA dramatically illustrates how the executive
branch, acting through the administrative agencies, can virtually emasculate statutes through strategic
inaction." Id. at 353.
48. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) (Supp. 11 1984) (requiring EPA to revoke interim permits
for facilities failing to comply with groundwater monitoring and financial responsibility requirements
by Nov. 8, 1985).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 6927(e) (Supp. 11 1984) (mandating biennial inspections of hazardous waste
facilities).
In March 1985, EPA completed an inspection and enforcement strategy aimed at bringing 90% of
TSDF's into compliance with applicable standards by 1989. A recent General Accounting Office
assessment of the strategy, however, raises doubts about EPA's prospects for achieving this goal. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF EPA's HAZARDOUS WASTE ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY(1985).
50. RCRA regulations are subject to the delays and inflexibility endemic to the rulemaking pro-
cess. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. Even optimistic agency and congressional projec-
tions concerning future improvements recognize significant limitations on the flexibility and timeliness
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In addition, effective regulation will continue to depend upon EPA en-
forcement budgets,51 which have been sorely inadequate despite close pub-
lic attention to hazardous waste issues. Growing pressures on federal and
state budgets lengthen the odds against the sustained commitment to credi-
ble enforcement that would be required for statutory and regulatory re-
strictions to exert effective control. Under these circumstances, insurance-
based incentives, with their reliance on private rather than public enforce-
ment devices, offer considerable advantages.
2. Existing Financial Responsibility Requirements
Both RCRA and CERCLA contain financial responsibility provi-
sions.52 These provisions differ significantly in the types of facilities and
damages to which they pertain. Given appropriate reforms, financial re-
sponsibility under RCRA and, more importantly, under CERCLA, can
play important roles in augmenting direct regulation of hazardous wastes.
a. RCRA Financial Responsibility
RCRA regulations require owners and operators of TSDF's (but not
waste generators or transporters) to demonstrate two forms of financial
responsibility. Facility owners and operators must first ensure that ade-
quate funds will be available to meet their own estimates of the costs of
closing their facilities and maintaining protections against releases for a
of hazardous waste regulation. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 44, at 18 (estimating that 36
to 48 months are required to review individual applications for final landfill permits).
The RCRA program also appears to have been handicapped by unusually erratic management. See,
e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 2o SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE ENFORCEMENT 31-36 (Comm. Print
1982); see also Control and Enforcement Hearings, supra note 46, at 409-15 (enforcement problems
attributed to lack of commitment by high-level officials).
Some deviation from a policy of full cost internalization may be warranted by legitimate concerns
about the effects that increased disposal costs could have on the incidence of illegal, "midnight" dump-
ing. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. These concerns justify, at most, measured relaxa-
tion of those standards most likely to elicit environmentally harmful responses. They cannot justify lax
enforcement or delays in issuing regulatory standards.
51. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
52. See RCRA §§ 3004(a)(6), 3004(t), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(a)(6), 6924(t) (1982 & Supp. 111984);
CERCLA § 108(b), 9608(b) (1982).
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period of thirty years.5" Facilities must also maintain coverage "for bodily
injury and property damage to third parties."'"
RCRA financial responsibility fails to provide adequate safety incen-
tives because existing regulations do not require TSDF's to internalize the
full costs of releases. Coverage requirements for closure and maintenance
undercut potential safety incentives by tying coverage levels to facilities'
own estimates of closure and maintenance costs, rather than to indepen-
dent estimates of the potential costs of meeting closure and maintenance
standards. The current approach can produce adequate coverage levels
only if agency officials conduct frequent, highly critical reviews of closure
plans. In actuality, reviews of TSDF estimates of closure and post-closure
costs have been infrequent and cursory at best. 5
RCRA coverage requirements for liability to third parties do not rely
on facility owners' assessments of potential liability. They nevertheless fail
to internalize the full costs of TSDF operations because required levels of
coverage fall far short of potential third-party damages." Current regula-
tions also allow facilities to operate with third-party liability coverage that
applies only to claims filed during a specified policy period-typically one
year.5 7 Unlike traditional "occurrence-based" policies, which cover all
losses caused by events transpiring during the coverage period (even if
53. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.111-.120, .142-.145, 265.111-.117, .142-.145 (1984); Revision to Closure
and Post-Closure Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,422 (1986) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40
C.F.R. pts. 264, 265). The 30-year period of post-closure care can extend well beyond the transfer of
liability for third-party damages from owners and operators to the Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund.
See supra note 40.
The regulations specify several acceptable means of providing assurances for closure and post-
closure costs, including a combined financial test and corporate guarantees, insurance, trust funds,
surety bonds, and letters of credit. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.143, .145-.146, 265.143, .145-.146 (1984); Revi-
sions to Closure and Post-Closure Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,422 (1986) (to be codified in scattered
subsections of 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265).
54. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147, 265.147 (1984); Revisions to Liability Coverage Standards, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,350 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147, .151, 265.147). Current regulations
require TSDF's to maintain coverage levels of $1 million per occurrence ($2 million annually) for
"sudden, accidental occurrences" and $3 million per occurrence ($6 million annually) for "nonsudden"
accidental occurrences." Like the coverage requirements for closure and post-closure costs, third-party
liability regulations permit several coverage options. Id.
55. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 44, at 12-13 (only one of 21 inspectors in four-state
survey claimed to conduct thorough evaluations of closure plans; others cited lack of "time, training,
detailed criteria, and cost estimation guides" needed to perform adequate review).
Moreover, even if EPA and the states could be assumed to scrutinize closure plans as carefully as
would profit-conscious insurers under a system requiring guarantees of adequate closure, the latter
approach would still enjoy marked efficiency advantages because insurers can more readily change
their standards in response to technological change and improved information. See supra notes 30-31
and accompanying text.
56. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES
OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, Mis-
soulI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS (Comm. Print 1980) (describing injuries and compensation actions
arising from toxic substances pollution).
57. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147, 265.147 (1985). For an explanation of EPA's reasons for permitting
claims-made coverage, see 47 Fed. Reg. 16,544, 16,548 (1982).
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they do not become manifest until after the coverage has lapsed), these so-
called "claims-made" policies allow insurers to avoid any potential liabil-
ity by canceling coverage at the end of a policy period."8 Claims-made
coverage neither deters nor assures compensation for long-latent harms. 9
b. CERCLA Financial Responsibility
Section 108 of CERCLA60 imposes financial responsibility require-
ments on ships that carry hazardous substances and authorizes the imposi-
tion of regulatory standards on other facilities, including generators and
transporters of hazardous substances"'-enterprises not subject to finan-
cial responsibility regulation under RCRA. EPA has not yet issued, or
even proposed, CERCLA financial responsibility regulations for facilities
not covered by statutory requirements.6 2
Were EPA to move forward with CERCLA financial responsibility re-
quirements, 3 two aspects of the current statute would impede the
development of effective insurance-based incentives. First, CERCLA's fi-
nancial responsibility provisions require coverage against liability for
cleanup costs and natural resource damages assessed under an extremely
expansive liability standard. Section 107 of the Act64 has been interpreted
to impose strict6 5  and, more important, joint and
58. See Smith, supra note 15, at 341-42.
59. See Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort Compensation Funds, 2 VA.
J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 123, 140 (1982) ("Claims-made coverage deliberately postpones calculation of
and responsibility for most of the consequences of present risky behavior.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1982).
61. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982) (CEROLA "facilities" include "any site or area where
a hazardous substance has ...come to be located") with 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(3), (33)-(34), 6924
(1982 & Supp. II 1984) (definitions of facilities subject to RCRA financial responsibility
requirements).
62. EPA, in fact, is nearly three years behind the statutory deadline for identifying the facilities
for which standards will first be developed. See 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(1) (1982). The agency has,
however, requested comments to assist it in identifying high-risk facilities. Notice, 48 Fed. Reg.
21,598 (1983).
63. EPA may soon be subject to a statutory deadline for promulgating CERCLA financial re-
sponsibility regulations. The Superfund reauthorization bill approved by the House on Dec. 10, 1985,
would require EPA to issue these regulations on a tight timetable following the bill's enactment. H.R.
2005, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. [House version, formerly H.R. 2817] § 108(a), 131 CONG. REC. HII,619,
H11,625 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985). The only financial responsibility provisions in the Senate bill
pertain to coverage requirements for ocean incineration vessels. H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. [Sen-
ate version, formerly S. 51] § 108(c) 131 CONG. REC. S12,184, S12,185 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1985).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
65. CERCLA does not specify strict liability. Strict liability is imported by section 101(32), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982), which incorporates the liability standard of § 311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). Section 107(b) of CERCLA creates defenses to
CEROLA liability for damages resulting from "act[s] of God," "act[s] of war," and unforeseeable acts
or omissions of third parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). Courts have properly declined to expand
these narrow defenses into a fault standard of liability. See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also United States v.
LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopting narrow interpretation of
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several"6 liability on firms that generate, store, treat, transport, or dispose
of hazardous substances.67 A strict liability standard probably makes
claims more predictable than they would be under a negligence stan-
dard."8 However, joint and several liability allows parties that contribute
only small quantities of hazardous substances to release sites to be held
liable for the full amount of cleanup costs and resource damages.69 Where
net assets, rather than contributions to release problems, represent the pri-
mary determinant of liability, insurance markets cannot provide effective
loss avoidance incentives.7 0
CERCLA also restricts insurers' ability to condition coverage on adher-
ence to policy provisions. Section 108(c) requires insurers to assume initial
liability for all response costs and resource damages, irrespective of any
analagous third-party defense provisions under Clean Water Act), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981).
See generally Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,224, 10,228-29 (1984) (summarizing legislative history and judi-
cial interpretations limiting role of fault in CERCLA liability).
66. Language calling for joint and several liability was deleted during the negotiations that se-
cured the enactment of CERCLA in the waning days of the 96th Congress. See Comment, supra note
65, at 10,231. Nevertheless, the Act's legislative history has generally been interpreted to authorize
joint and several liability to the extent that it would be appropriate under common law standards. See,
e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,272, 20,275-76 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,
808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (joint and several liability must be tempered by deference to Congress' intent
to avoid harsh and unfair outcomes).
EPA's policy governing settlement negotiations with potentially liable parties utilizes the threat of
joint and several liability to increase negotiated recoveries from private parties. See EPA Interim
Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5037 (1985); see also Light, A Defense Counsel's Perspective
on Superfund, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203, 10,206 n.20 (1985) (government's com-
plaints in Superfund actions invariably allege joint and several liability).
Section 107(e)(2) of CERCLA preserves any right of contribution that a defendant subject to joint
and several liability would have under applicable state law. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982); see South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) at 20,276 n.8; Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp. at 807 n.3. This provision does not provide a predictable limit on a generator's liability, how-
ever, because many states continue to disallow contribution among joint tortfeasors, and because con-
tribution statutes provide no relief if other tortfeasors are unidentified or judgment-proof. See Rogers,
Three Years of Superfund, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,362-63 (1983).
67. Section 107(a)(3) of CERCLA limits generator liablity to persons who "arrange" for disposal
or treatment at sites where releases or threatened releases subsequently materialize. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(3) (1982). To date, the courts have interpreted "arranging" broadly, so that few generators
appear to fall outside the reach of CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Missouri v. Independent Petrochemi-
cal Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (allowing recovery action against generator who arranged
for disposal at site other than eventual release site); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (rejecting argument that generator must select site to "arrange for disposal"). See
generally Comment, "Arranging for Disposal" Under CERCLA: When Is a Generator Liable?, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,160 (1985) (summarizing case law on generator liability).
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. See Comment, supra note 65, at 10,225.
70. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF DOMESTIC FINANCE, HAZARDOUS SUB-
SrANCE LIABILrrv INSURANCE 111 (1982); see also Light, supra note 66, at 10,207 (incentives "dis-
sipated by a system which punishes on the basis of financial resources rather than improper con-
duct"); Schmalz, Superfunds and Tort Law Reforms-Are They Insurable?, 38 Bus. LAW. 175, 184
(1982) ("chaotic situation" created by imposition of strict liability on numerous firms for same
injury).
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(nonwillful) violations of contract conditions by insureds.' To recover de-
ductibles and losses attributable to violations of policy restrictions, insur-
ers must bring separate actions against insureds .7 2 By increasing the costs
of administering loss-control incentives, these restrictions limit the poten-
tial deterrent effects of CEROLA financial responsibility.
B. The Role for Insurance-Based Incentives in Controlling Hazardous
Wastes
Environmental damage caused by the release of hazardous wastes fits
the profile developed in Part I of harms that can be deterred effectively by
insurance-based incentives. First, the costs of hazardous waste cleanups
appear to be large-' in relation both to the costs of establishing liability 4
and to the costs of classifying and screening risks for insurance purposes .7 5
Second, releases often occur years after the storage or disposal of hazard-
ous wastes. Application of insurers' expertise in assigning current prices
to long term risks could therefore confer significant advantages.7 6 Finally,
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c) (1982). The House's Superfund reauthorization bill would redress this
problem by requiring that claims be asserted initially against insureds except in cases where bank-
ruptcy or jurisdictional obstacles preclude such actions. H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. [House
version, formerly H.R. 2817] § 108(d), 131 CONG. REc. H11,619, H11,625 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
72. See Cheek, supra note 21, at 172-73.
73. A recent projection of Superfund financing requirements by the Office of Technology Assess-
ment surveyed estimates of site cleanup costs from a number of sources. Figures ranged from $1
million (1984 estimate for less serious sites advanced by the Association of State and Territorial Solid
Waste Management Officials) to $30 million per site (1984 estimate developed for the Chemical
Manufacturers Association- by Arthur D. Little, Inc.). See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 32, at 36.
74. Because of the difficulty of tracing individual injuries to hazardous waste exposures, the ratio
of administrative costs to compensation is likely to be higher in suits for personal injuries linked to
hazardous wastes than in suits for cleanup costs and resource damages. See DiBenedetto, supra note
37, at 617 ("Even if causation can be established, .the cost [of proving causation in personal injury
cases] may be prohibitive to many hazardous waste plaintiffs."); see also SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e)
STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES: ANALYSIS AND IMPROVE-
MENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES 225-29 (1982) (recommending separate administrative recovery system
for personal injuries to minimize administrative costs).
75. Even under current rules, which deny insurers the scale economies that would accompany
more extensive financial responsibility requirements, insurers have found that the expected savings in
payouts justify fairly aggressive monitoring and incentive devices. See Kunzman, The Insurer as Sur-
rogate Regulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution or Perversion?, 20 FORUM 469, 477
(1985) (describing detailed inspection and risk assessment process); Smith, supra note 15, at 341
(describing screening for environmental damage coverage); see also MacIntyre, Insurers Can 'Make
Money' on EIL Coverage: Scientist, Bus. INS., May 28, 1985, at 67, 68 (describing risk reduction
program of prominent waste management firm and effects of loss avoidance on availability of
insurance).
76. Some previous commentaries on the subject of hazardous wastes and insurance have stressed
the difficulties that uncertain risks pose for insurers when they decide about prices and policy condi-
tions. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 59, at 127; Kunzman, supra note 75, at 481-82. Negative
assessments of the effectiveness of insurance-based incentives on this count are unpersuasive, however,
without some comparison to alternative, purportedly superior control mechanisms. In ignoring insur-
ers' significant advantages over regulators in coping with the formidable technical uncertainties associ-
ated with hazardous waste management, these commentaries overlook a critical aspect of the issue.
Insurance-Based Incentives
control of hazardous waste management calls for a degree of variegation
and adaptability that direct regulation is ill-suited to provide.
1. Potential Practical Obstacles
Two potential obstacles to the development of insurance-based incen-
tives warrant attention: illegal dumping and its relationship to the costs of
legal disposal, and recent trends in pollution insurance markets. Although
neither factor undermines the case for insurance-based incentives, each
could influence the content of an appropriate implementation strategy.
a. Illegal Disposal
If generators and transporters were certain to deliver all hazardous
wastes to permitted facilities regardless of cost, RCRA financial responsi-
bility requirements for TSDF's alone would suffice to internalize the most
significant costs of improper hazardous waste management. In the absence
of illegal dumping problems, stringent financial responsibility require-
ments for TSDF's would reduce environmental risks through both mecha-
nisms described in Part I. First, risk categorization by insurers and other
financial guarantors would create specific incentives for TSDF's to reduce
expected damages. In addition, general increases in the prices of TSDF
services would encourage generators and transporters to find substitutes
for TSDF services, such as high-temperature incineration, waste re-
cycling, and production techniques that reduce waste output."
Unfortunately, the desire to internalize the costs of hazardous waste
management must be tempered by concerns about the effects of increased
costs on the incidence of "midnight dumping." Although the exact dimen-
sions of the illegal dumping problem are unknown,78 Congress,79 EPA,80
and the states81 have all recognized the extreme difficulty of enforcing
prohibitions on illegal disposal and the resultant need to moderate cost
77. Even in this world of perfect compliance, however, financial responsibility for generators and
transporters under CERCLA might still be warranted as a means of reducing the number and sever-
ity of accidental releases that occur before wastes are delivered to TSDF's.
78. See Post-Closure Liability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation
and Tourism of the House Energy and Commerce Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1984) (state-
ment of Linda Greer, scientist for the Environmental Defense Fund) (suggesting that New York
State's taxation of wastes at disposal sites sharply increased the incidence of illegal dumping); U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES 9-13 (1985) [hereinafter
ILLEGAL DISPOSAL] (general consensus on importance of illegal disposal problem despite uncertainty
concerning precise dimensions).
79. See Profile of Organized Crime-Great Lakes Region: Hearings Before the Permanent Sub-
comm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 284-86
(1984) (reporting on survey of enforcement actions against illegal dumpers in 50 states).
80. ILLEGAL DISPOSAL, supra note 78, at 10-11 (EPA receives three times as many credible
reports of illegal dumping as it is able to investigate).
81. Id. at 11 (describing state enforcement officials' perceptions of the illegal dumping problem).
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internalization in view of the effects of increased disposal costs on the inci-
dence of illegal dumping.82
The importance of keeping wastes within the authorized disposal sys-
tem, despite that system's plain shortcomings, heightens the need for fi-
nancial responsibility standards for generators and transporters under
CEROLA. As long as the prices charged for treatment, storage, and dis-
posal services fall short of the full social costs of disposal, financial respon-
sibility under CERCLA can create beneficial incentives for generators and
transporters to minimize their reliance on socially detrimental disposal
options.
b. The Market for Pollution Insurance
The use of financial responsibility to encourage appropriate practices
by generators and transporters could also be constrained by limits on in-
surance capacity and by insurers' purported reluctance to undertake ag-
gressive research and risk management programs.83 Although the market
for pollution coverage has been characterized by significant growth and
innovation over the past fifteen to twenty years,84 current conditions lend
some credence to these concerns. During the past two years, the market
for pollution coverage has contracted sharply, coverage limits have fallen,
and insurers have replaced occurrence-based with claims-made coverage.8"
These trends have been ascribed to unanticipated underwriting losses, un-
certainty about the technical determinants of environmental risks, and
82. EPA is no doubt reluctant to cite compliance problems as a formal justification for limiting
the stringency of regulatory requirements. The Agency did, however, explicitly rely on this argument
in opposing a 1982 proposal to regulate "small generators" (firms producing less than 1000 kilograms
of hazardous waste per month). In its 1982 Pollution Control Guide, the EPA stated that "reduction
or elimination of the exemption for [small quantity generators] would be more likely to result in
mismanagement and 'midnight dumping' rather than proper waste disposal." See DiBenedetto, supra
note 37, at 627 n.121.
83. See Katz, RIMS President Accuses Insurers of Abdicating Their Risk-Taking Role, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY EDITION, Oct. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 3; see also Pfennigstorf,
Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 347, 446-47 (criticizing
perceived passivity of insurers' approach to environmental risks).
84. Two forms of coverage against pollution liability have evolved over the past two decades:
occurrence coverage under Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies, and claims-based cover-
age under Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) policies. CGL coverage for pollution first
gained widespread acceptance in the late 1960's. Since then, the numbers of policies written and the
stringency of standard coverage restrictions have varied with changes in insurers' assessments of future
pollution liabilities. See Pollution Liability Coverage Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,902, 33,903-04 (1985);
Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 552-54 (1980).
EIL coverage, which, unlike many CGL policies, extends to claims for gradual pollution, became
widely available around 1981 due largely to the efforts of the Pollution Liability Insurance Associa-
tion, a reinsurance pool comprising roughly 40 insurers. See Pollution Liability Coverage Notice,
supra, at 33,904.
85. Diamond, Insurance Against Pollution Is Cut, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
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fears that further changes in legal rules will undermine the basis upon
which policies are currently written.86
The significance of the recent contraction in pollution insurance mar-
kets to the viability of insurance-based incentives can easily be overstated.
Increasing prices are a predictable, necessary response to insurers' reap-
praisals of risk based on loss experience and improved information. De-
creases in the amount of coverage purchased follow predictably from these
price increases, at least as long as firms creating environmental risks are
permitted to operate without liability coverage. 7
The critical question for the viability of insurance-based incentives is
not whether enterprises that impose environmental risks can obtain cover-
age at prices they find affordable, but whether insurance markets, in set-
ting the premiums for insuring environmental risks, produce tolerably ac-
curate evaluations of the social costs that these enterprises are likely to
impose. Insurers' innovative approaches to new and uncertain risks, both
in pollution coverage"' and in other fields, 9 suggests that a competition
exists in these markets. In the absence of any indication that insurers reg-
ularly overestimate risks (a phenomenon that would be unlikely to persist
in a competitive market for risks), there is no basis for projecting that
hazardous waste facilities subject to stringent financial responsibility re-
quirements would be unable to obtain coverage on terms that assign ap-
propriate prices to the risks that these facilities create. 90
86. See Pollution Liability Coverage Notice, supra note 84, at 33,904-06.
87. One of the principal strengths of a system of market incentives is its capacity to adapt quickly
to new information about risks. Without financial responsibility requirements, however, sharp rate
increases may provide an incentive for insureds to externalize expected accident costs rather than to
minimize risks.
It is important not to exaggerate the magnitude of the recent losses incurred by liability insurers.
Total reserves of property and casualty insurers increased every year from 1970 through 1983, reach-
ing $122.7 billion before the $3.55 billion loss recorded in 1984 (the last year for which figures are
available). See Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1985) (written submission of T. Lawrence Jones,
President, American Insurance Association); see also Hunter, Taming the Latest Insurance "Crisis",
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, at F3, col. 1 (noting recent increases in prices of insurance stocks as
premiums rise).
88. See, e.g., Smeehuyzen, Program Designed to Insure Risks Found in Hazardous Waste In-
dustry, ROUGH NOTES, July 1983, at 37 (describing development of associations and service groups to
ease pollution coverage transactions).
89. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INSURANCE AND THE COM-
MERCIALIZATION OF SPACE, 3-10 (Comm. Print 1985) (detailing development of satellite coverage,
including casualty coverage exceeding $100 million per launch and liability coverage as high as $750
million per launch, despite extremely limited experience base).
90. Some experts have predicted that the contraction in pollution markets will be short-lived, even
if EPA fails to tighten coverage requirements and to expand their scope. See, e.g., Finlayson, EIL
Market Could Rebound, Panelists Say, Bus. INS., Apr. 29, 1985, at 44; see also MacIntyre, supra
note 75, at 67 (" 'There is enough science to determine the degree and duration [of hazardous waste
risks].'") (statement of Michael J. Murphy, chief operating officer of Risk Sciences International).
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2. Promoting Insurance-Based Incentives for Hazardous Wastes
Both RCRA and CERCLA financial responsibility provisions provide
potential bases for beneficial insurance-based incentives. RCRA financial
responsibility could engender more effective safety incentives if two
changes were made. First, EPA should revise the rules governing closure
and post-closure coverage for TSDF's to require guarantees of adequate
closure and maintenance, rather than savings pegged to unreliable and
self-serving closure cost estimates.9 In addition, EPA should mandate
higher levels of occurrence-based coverage for third-party claims.9 2 How-
ever, cost internalization at TSDF's is likely to be limited by well-founded
concerns about the effects of cost increases on the incidence of illegal
dumping.
Promotion of insurance-based incentives under CERCLA will require
two significant statutory changes. First, Section 107(c)93 should be
amended, prospectively, to limit generators' and transporters' liability to
damages attributable to wastes that they have generated or transported.
Damages from future releases involving wastes from multiple sources
should be apportioned on a volumetric basis, with appropriate weighting
for factors such as toxicity and propensity to migrate." If applied to re-
leases of wastes that were disposed of before the RCRA tracking system
was implemented, this reform would undermine cost recovery efforts by
imposing impossible burdens of proof on the government and private
claimants.95 Apportionment rules should be changed, therefore, only with
respect to wastes tracked under the RCRA waste manifest system. Liabil-
ity with respect to wastes disposed of before, or in disregard of, RCRA
tracking requirements should be determined under the existing joint and
several standard.9
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1982).
94. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984), adopted a
"moderate approach to joint and several liability." The court looked to the Gore Amendment, a joint
and several liability provision that had been adopted by the House but rejected by the Senate and the
House-Senate conferees during Congress' consideration of CERCLA. The Amendment would have
directed courts to apportion liability among contributors to a release site based on six criteria, includ-
ing the amount and toxicity of the waste contributed. Id. In view of Congress' ultimate rejection of
these provisions, other district courts have understandably declined to apportion liability. See supra
note 66.
95. See Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 51 and S. 494 Before the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1985) (testimony of F. Habicht,
Assistant Attorney General, Lands and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice)
(Superfund litigation concerning existing sites would become "extraordinarily costly and cumbersome
without joint and several liability."); Comment, supra note 65, at 10,225 (discussing evidentiary justi-
fication for joint and several liability).
96. Even if given only prospective effect, this reform will reduce the fraction of cleanup costs that
can be recovered from private parties, thus requiring increased contributions from other sources. Ex-
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Second, Congress should amend the CERCLA requirement that insur-
ers provide "first dollar"97 coverage to permit contracts that make in-
sureds directly liable for certain deductible amounts. Such a revision
would not significantly affect recoveries but could substantially reduce the
costs to insurers of enforcing policy conditions.9"
III. CONCLUSIONS
This Note has argued, based on both theoretical considerations and the
performance of existing regulatory policies, that insurance-based incen-
tives could contribute significantly to the control of risks associated with
hazardous wastes. Given appropriate liability standards and a relaxation
of restrictions on incentive mechanisms in insurance contracts, incentives
engendered by financial responsibility requirements under RCRA and
CERCLA could provide badly needed reinforcement of regulatory
controls.
The proliferation of relatively low-cost technologies with the potential
to create enormous public harm suggests a growing role for financial re-
sponsibility requirements. Areas in which rapid technical change outpaces
regulatory adjustments, such as genetic engineering 9 and chemical engi-
neering, 100 may be particularly appropriate fields in which to supplement
regulation with insurance-based incentives. In these and other areas in
which asset limitations can undermine the deterrent effects of liability
panded funding from feedstock taxes and general appropriations, the initial sources of Superfund
revenues, would impose greater costs on some firms (such as generators that cannot be linked to
existing sites) and on taxpayers. These cost shifts are amply justified, however, by the benefits of
promoting insurance-based incentives.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c) (1982); see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
98. Greater regularity in the relationship between the behavior of insureds and consequences for
insurers would also be promoted by regulations that clarified the goals of CERCLA cleanups (i.e.,
that resolved the "How clean is clean?" issue) and established procedures for assessing natural re-
source damages. EPA's existing regulatory cleanup standard, 40 C.F.R. § 300.680) (1984), "[a]t best
... only repeats rather than implements the [broad] statutory goal," providing little guidance for
estimates of potential liability in particular situations. See Brown, Superfund and the National Con-
tingency Plan, How Dirty is "Dirty"? How Clean is "Clean"?, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 127 (1984).
Similarly, the Department of Interior, charged with developing a mechanism for assessing natural
resource damages under CERCLA, has yet to provide any guidance concerning potential liability,
despite a December 1982 statutory deadline for promulgation of resource damage standards. See 42
U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (1982). See generally Comment, Theories of State Recovery Under CERCLA for
Injuries to the Environment, 24 NAT. REsoustcEs J. 1101 (1984) (proposing theories under which
states could recover in the absence of authoritative guidance).
99. For a description of existing legal controls over genetic engineering, see Karny, Regulation of
Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins but Time for Action on Commercial Pro-
duction, 12 U. ToL L. REv. 815 (1981).
100. The virtual breakdown of the pre-testing mechanism that Congress intended to establish
under the Toxic Substances Control Act suggests that insurance-based incentives could provide a par-
ticularly useful supplement to regulation in the control of risks posed by new chemical substances. See
U.S, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF NEw CHEMICAL REGULATION UNDER THE
Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL Acr (1984).
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rules, policies informed by an awareness of the advantages and prerequi-
sites of insurance-based incentives could significantly reduce the combined
costs of accidents and avoidance measures.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
On October 17, 1986, as this issue was going to press, President
Reagan signed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986.101 The amendments include important revisions to CERCLA's fi-
nancial responsibility terms. These revisions enumerate financial responsi-
bility options,102 shorten the phase-in period for financial responsibility
regulations, 03 and require parties seeking to recover for cleanup costs or
natural resource damages to press claims directly against responsible par-
ties (rather than against financial guarantors) unless responsible parties
are insolvent or outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.04 The last of
these revisions essentially eliminates the preexisting first-dollar coverage
requirements, and should, for the reasons discussed above, reduce the costs
of enforcing useful incentive conditions in financial responsbility con-
tracts. 10 5 Other provisions of the 1986 amendments revise portions of
CERCLA that are also relevant, though less important than the financial
responsibility terms, to the preceding analysis. These provisions suspend
transfers of liability for releases from closed facilities to the Post-Closure
Liability Trust Fund, pending completion of a study of post-closure costs
by the Comptroller General;108 impose stricter, more precise standards for
completion of CERCLA cleanup actions; 1 7 and require promulgation of
regulations for assessing natural resource damages within six months of
the enactment of the amendments.10 8 The amendments do not, however,
101. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
102. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 108(a), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(2)).
103. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 108(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b)(3)). This amendment reduces the adjustment period for any
regulations that are eventually promulgated, but, like the original legislation, imposes no diadline for
promulgation. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
104. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 108(c), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat. 1613) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9608(c)). This revision applies only to releases from land-based facilities;
financial guarantors for ships remain liable for first-dollar coverage. Compare supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 71-72, 97-98 and accompanying text.
106. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 201, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k); see supra note 40.
107. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 121, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9621). This provision clarifies the indeterminate statutory language on
cleanup standards discussed supra note 98.
108. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 107(e), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1)-(2)). This provision replaces the three-year deadline, now
lapsed, set forth in the original legislation. See supra note 98.
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alter CERCLA's liability standards.1 09 The argument for changes that
would allow financial guarantors to predict liability on the basis of safety
practices, therefore, loses none of its force. 10
109. Section 113(b) of the amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 1613 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0) expressly authorizes contribu-
tion actions by parties held jointly and severally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This provision,
however, like the Act's prior authorization of contribution actions under state law, supra note 66, does
not provide a reliable limit on generator liability because of the likelihood that joint tortfeasors will be
unidentifiable or judgment proof.
110. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
